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EFFECT OF VIRGINIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
UPON THE RIGHT OF A THIRD-PARTY TORTFEASOR TO
OBTAIN CONTRIBUTION FROM AN EMPLOYER WHOSE
CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE CAUSED EMPLOYEE'S
DEATH OR INJURY
Robert L Stevenson*
The Supreme Court of Virginia has never been asked to determine
a third party's contribution rights where his negligence has com-
bined with that of an employer to cause personal injury to an em-
ployee covered by the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act
[hereinafter referred to as the Act].' Although the question is a
novel one in Virginia, 2 courts in other jurisdictions have coped with
the problem and have arrived at diverse solutions.3 At the outset, a
brief review of the Act and of the Virginia contribution statute
seems appropriate.
I. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN VIRGINIA
The Act covers work-related injuries suffered by employees, and
it establishes a compulsory4 and exclusive5 system of employer lia-
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Minn., 1957. Assc., Brown, Wood, Fuller and Caldwell, NYC, 1937-42; Ass't. Corp. Counsel,
United Aircraft Corp., East Hartford, Conn., 1952-55; Sr. Atty., Off. of Gen. Counsel, Ford
Motor Co., 1955-60; Director of Alumni Relations and Registrar, Yale, 1960-65; Lect., Con-
necticut, 1966; Professor of Law, Idaho, 1966-74; Professor of Law, University of Richmond
since 1974.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-1 to -137 (Repl. Vol. 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1978). It-was recently
estimated that 85% of all products liability cases entail work related injuries. Insurance Co.
of North America Products Liability: Some Professional Considerations, Booklet HH-8306-3
(1976).
2. On the basis of an educated guess as to Virginia law, contribution has in recent years
been denied by two United States District Courts. Jennings v. Franz Torwegge Mach. Works,
347 F. Supp. 1288 (W.D. Va. 1972); Mahone v. McGraw-Edison Co., 281 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.
Va. 1968). In each instance it would have been helpful bad Virginia either by Supreme Court
rule or statute enacted the Uniform Certificate of Questions of Law Act. Florida has done so
by court rule..FLA. ApP. R. 4.61. Maryland and West Virginia have done so by statute. 2B
MD. CODE ANN., Art. 26, § 161 (Repl. Vol. 1973 and 1978); W. VA. CODE § 51-1A-1 to -10 (Cum.
Supp. 1978).
3. The cases are collected in Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977 (1957). See generally 2A A. LARsoN,
WoPRMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 76.20 (1976).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-23 (Repl. Vol. 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
5. Id. § 65.1-40.
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bility therefor irrespective of fault.' When enacted in 1918, the Act
contained no tie-in provision relating to an injured employee's right
to recover damages for the same injury from a negligent third party.
Because of this omission and because the Act has never purported
to extinguish rights outside of the employment relationship, 7 a dou-
ble recovery by the employee was permissible in that he was entitled
not only to his compensation award, but also to the entire amount
recovered from the third party.' Therefore, in 1920, the Act was
amended by adding a section which automatically assigns to the
employer the employee's cause of action against the third party and
provides that, if the recovery in such action exceeds the compensa-
tion award, the excess is for the employee's benefit.9 Hence, if the
amount so recovered equals or exceeds the compensation award, the
employer escapes scot-free. Though the result is appropriate where
the employer is without blame, it is inequitable where both the
employer and the third party have been negligent. This is the sort
of inequity which the law of contribution should Correct.
6. As explained in Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 95, 135 S.E. 890, 891 (1926),
the Act is
in the nature of a compromise between employer and employee to settle their differ-
ences arising out of personal injuries, but it is a compromise greatly to the advantage
of the employee. By it the question of the negligence of the employer is eliminated,
the common law doctrines of the assumption of risk, fellow servants, and contributory
negligence are abolished, and the rules of evidence are laxly enforced. . . . The relief
afforded is fixed, certain and speedy, and at a time when most needed. Under it there
is no doubt or uncertainty as to the right of recovery or the amount thereof. The
damage resulting from an accident is treated as a part of the expense of. . . repairing
a piece of machinery which has broken down.
7. In Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 522, 65 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1951), the court observed:
The purpose and effect of the compensation act are to control and regulate the relations
between employer and employee. As between them the remedies therein provided are
exclusive. It does not extinguish rights outside of and beyond the employment. Conse-
quently, as to these, the employee's common-law remedies remain unimpaired, and
they are not to be considered as altered or changed except where the legislative intent
has been plainly manifested by statute.
8. The result of this omission was described as follows in Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96,
100, 38 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1946):
Hence, an employee who has sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment would have been entitled to receive compensation under the
statute from his employer and would have a right to full compensation from a negligent
third party, a stranger to the employment. . ..
9. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.1-41 to -43 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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II. CONTRIBUTION IN VIRGINIA
For more than a half century, Virginia, by statute, has authorized"contribution among wrongdoers . . . when the wrong results from
negligence and involves no moral turpitude."'' 0 Despite some dictum
to the contrary, the statute replicates not only English common
law," but also Virginia common law.'" Judge Martin P. Burks, the
author of the statute, explained that the reason for its enactment
was that "courts have had difficulty in declaring what the law is on
the subject of contribution among wrongdoers."' 3 Thus the statute
10. Id. § 8.01-34 (Repl. Vol. 1977). The provision first appeared as § 5779 of the 1919
Virginia Code.
11. Palmer v. Wick and Pultneyville Steam Shipping Co., [18941 A.C. 318; Wooley v.
Batte, 2 C. & P. 417, 172 Eng. Rep. 188 (1826). See CLARK & IMND nsas ToRnS 56 (2d ed.
1896) where in note b, the authors say:
It is sometimes loosely said that there is no contribution between joint tort-feasors,
that is to say, that if, on an action being brought for a joint tort, one wrongdoer pays
the whole damages recovered, he cannot, whatever the nature of the tort, recover a
proportion of the damages from the others. For this wide proposition there is appar-
ently no authority except the head-note to the report of Merryweather v. Nixan in the
Term Reports (9 T.R. 186), which head-note does not seem to be borne out by the
judgment.
12. Thweatt v. Jones, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 328 (1823). A tobacco inspector had mistakenly
delivered a quantity of tobacco covered by a negotiable warehouse receipt to someone not
entitled thereto. Upon being held liable for this innocent misappropriation, he sought contri-
bution from his equally culpable co-inspector. Judge Green of the Court of Appeals said at
page 334:
When parties are equally bound to bear a burden, and are in aequalijure, that is, liable
from the same circumstances existing as to both, contribution is due of right, in equity:
that this general proposition is liable to one exception, namely, that the party who
would otherwise be entitled to such contribution, forfeits such right, if the joint liabil-
ity arose from an act malum in se, a fraud or voluntary tort, in which he participated:
that when it is shewn that the parties were originally equally bound, and stood in
aequalijure, the party who has paid all, is entitled of course to contribution, unless it
be shewn on the other side, that his right has been forfeited as aforesaid, by his own
wrongful act....
I do not think, that the right to contribution ought to be considered as impaired by
the fact. . . that one of the parties and his estate was absolved by his death from all
liability to the party injured. He who claims contribution, does not claim by
substitution to the rights of the party whose demand he has satisfied; but, upon the
broader principle, that he who has exclusively borne the burden which ought to have
been bome jointly with 'another, is entitled to be rateably indemnified ...
13. Address as a member of the Code Revision Commission before the Virginia State Bar
Association (May 16, 1919) reprinted in 5 Va. L. Reg. (N.S.) 97, 115 (1919). The "difficulty"
Judge Burks had in mind was apparently not one experienced in Virginia, but probably
stemmed from an unfortunate reading of an early English case by Sir Frederick Pollock. See
Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence, 12 HARv. L. Rav. 176,
182 (1898).
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amounts to a legislative reiteration of the equitable duty of contri-
bution.'4
III. VARYING RESPONSES TO UNDERLYING PROBLEM
Some courts have denied contribution because the relevant work-
men's compensation statute specifically relieves the employer of
liability to anyone for the employee's injury except, of course, for
compensation benefits.'5 Other courts, in denying contribution,
have felt that their statute implicitly promises the employer immu-
nization from such liability. In any event such decisions are irrele-
vant in Virginia where the statutory promise of employer immunity
is limited to claims against the employer by the injured "employee,
his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of
kin. ... 16
Still, other courts have refused contribution on the ground that
since the employee under a workmen's compensation act has no tort
action against his employer, the employer is not a co-tortfeasor and
does not, therefore, share a common liability with the third party.' 7
The argument may have force in a jurisdiction where the contribu-
tion remedy is only available against a "co-tortfeasor."' 8 This, how-
ever, is not the case in Virginia where the contribution statute is as
broad as the common law in making a remedy available against any
negligent "wrongdoer."' 9 The same argument also may have force
14. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrruTiON § 81 (1937) where, with exceptions not presently
material, the Institute states that "a person who has discharged more than his proportionate
share ,of a duty owed by himself and another. . . is entitled to contribution from the other,
except where the payor is barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct."
15. See, e.g., Ward v. Denver & R.G.W.Ry. Co., 119 F. Supp. 112 (D. Colo. 1954). There,
the state statute provided that "[a]ny employer who has . . . complied with the provisions
[of the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act] .. . (shall not) be subject to any other
liability whatsoever for the death of or personal injury to any employee ... " Id. at 114.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
17. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d 179 (1955).
18. Even in such a jurisdiction this result is not obligatory. As Justice Roberts of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted, "the definition of 'joint tortfeasors' does not require
that they have a common liability toward the injured party but only that their combined
conduct be the cause of the injury." Elston v. Indus. Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d
318, 320 n.2 (1966).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Given the breadth of the term "wrongdoer"
as used in the Virginia statute, contribution would appear to be available whenever the
judgment against the third party is based on his unintentional error, whether such judgment
is technically grounded in negligence as a matter of tort law, so-called "strict" liability as
[Vol. 13:117
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in a situation where the person against whom contribution is sought
is without legal liability of any sort to the person injured.2 This,
however, is not the situation in Virginia,2' where the Act has been
described as "in the nature of a compromise between employer and
employee" 2 and where the employer does have legal obliga-
tions-albeit of a different character from what they were at com-
mon law. Furthermore, the fact that legal obligations stem from
technically different sources has never, in comparable situations,
inhibited courts from allowing contribution. For example, absent a
statute to the contrary, a person who has compromised his liability
via a settlement with the injured person is not thereby relieved from
liability in contribution to a co-tortfeasor.?
There is "an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which
permits the entire burden of a loss for which two defendants were
equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one
embodied in RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965) or Article 2 of the U.C.C. The
latter has been dubbed strict products liability under the U.C.C. See Speidel, The Virginia
"Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51
VA. L. REv. 804 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Norfolk S. R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 84 (1934). The case arose
at a time when Virginia law gave no civil remedy to an injured, but unemancipated minor as
against his or her parent for what otherwise would constitute tortious conduct. Contribution
was denied a third party whose negligence had concurred with that of the parent in causing
the child's injuries.
21. Supra note 10. The non-subrogational quality of contribution also was true at common
law. In the Thweatt case, Judge Green said at page 334, "He who claims contribution, does
not claim by substitution to the rights of the party whose demand he has satisfied; but, upon
the broader principle, that he who has exclusively borne the burden which ought to have been
borne jointly with another, is entitled to be rateably indemnified ... "
22. Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 95, 135 S.E. 890, 891 (1926).
23. Buckley v. Basford, 184 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Me. 1960); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 50 N.W.2d 689 (1951); Blauvelt v. Village of
Nyack, 141 Misc. 730, 252 N.Y.S. 746 (1931); Blanchard v. Wilt, 410 Pa. 356, 188 A.2d 722
(1963); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 264 Wis. 493, 59 N.W.2d 425
(1953).
The precise question would not, of course, arise in a state which, like Virginia, frowns on
the utilization of covenents not to sue as an escape from the common law rule that the release
of one tortfeasor destroys a cause of action against a concurrent tortfeasor. See Shortt v.
Hudson Supply & Equip. Co., 191 Va. 306, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950). As far as contribution is
concerned, however, the philosophy of the above cases is reflected in VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.01-
443, which states:
If there be a judgment against one or more joint wrongdoers, the full satisfaction of
such judgment accepted as such by the plaintiff shall be a discharge of all joint
wrongdoers, except as to the costs; provided, however, this section shall have no effect
on the right of contribution between joint wrongdoers. . . .(emphasis added).
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alone. ... "A For this reason, Pennsylvania courts have allowed
contribution for several decades, but have arbitrarily limited such
contribution to the amount of the employer's compensation liabil-
ity.2 More recently, courts in Illinois," Minnesota,2 and New Yorke
have decided to allow an open-ended recovery. The Minnesota court
held that Federal constitutional law dictated the result.21 In any
event, itis both a fair and equitable approach which should appeal
to a court in a state in which, as in Virginia, the question is open.3"
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Toms 307 (4th ed. 1971).
25. See, e.g., Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 123 A.2d 837 (1956). A comparable rule is in force
in California and in North Carolina. See, e.g., Tate v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 213 Cal.
App.2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963) and Hunsucker v. High Point Bedding & Chair Co., 237
N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953).
26. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div., 70 Ill.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1978). See generally Com-
ment, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Co.: Adoption of Contribution in Illinois,
9 LOY. UNiv. L.J. 1015 (1978).
27. Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974).
28. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972). See
also Nelson v. Dykes Lumber Co., 52 App. Div.2d 808, 383 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1976); Lettiere v.
Nameloc Estates, Inc., 53 App.Div. 2d 899, 385 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1976).
29. See Carlson, supra note 27. The court said that the legislation in denying recovery had
provided no reasonable alternative to the common law right of contribution. The result seems
questionable in terms of modem federal constitutional law. In effect, this would constitute a
reversion to the substantive due process theories of the pre-New Deal Court. In this context
Mr. Justice Holmes a half century ago referred to the concept of equal protection as the "last
resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Modern libertari-
ans argue that the Court is institutionally incapable of making wealth reallocation decisions.
See Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 41. The Virginia Supreme Court appears not to have been overly enamored of the deus
ex machina utility of constitutional law and has usually decided cases by the use of tradi-
tional legal concepts.
30. Furthermore, as this article illustrates, Holmes was correct when he observed that
"lawyers spend a great deal of their time shoveling smoke."
